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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
State, holding that a debt, whether liquidated or not, is a sufficient
basis on which to predicate quasi in rem jurisdiction, at least to
the value of the debt8 5 The court found the equal protection
argument to be without merit since the defendant's treatment was
the same as that of any other non-resident defendant who is in-
sured by a carrier doing business in New York. Furthermore,
defendant here was in no worse position than a resident New
Yorker who is subject to in personam jurisdiction.
As to the due process defense, the court held that it was not legally
insufficient and, thus, concluded that it could not be dismissed on
motion. The court seemed disturbed by the consequence CPLR
320(c) might have on the defendant's right to have an adequate
and realistic opportunity to appear and be heard in defense. Ana-
lyzing 320(c) to have a leverage effect, the court recognized that
while the attachment of the contractual obligations only gives the
New York court jurisdiction to declare rights in that property, the
condition attached to defendant's right to defend its interest in that
property is that it submit to in personam jurisdiction. The court
further realized that if the defendant had defaulted, judgment
would be rendered against him, and the attached obligations, after
evaluation, would be paid to the plaintiff. Then, under CPLR
6204, the insurer would be discharged from his obligations to in-
vestigate, defend and indemnify the defendant if the plaintiff later
brought suit in defendant's home state. This would deprive the
defendant, both in New York and in its home state, of the defense
for which it contracted unless it submitted to in personam juris-
diction.
Do1 EsTIc RELATIONS LAW-THE NEW COOLING-OFF AND
CONCILIATION PROVISIONS
Marriage is often acclaimed the cornerstone of an ordered
society, and yet, until comparatively recently, there has been an
unfortunate failure of our domestic relations laws to provide effec-
tive means to salvage marriages needlessly headed to complete or
partial dissolution. Traditionally, the machinery of the law had
been primarily directed toward the alteration or extinguishment of
the status. However, the general consensus of the domestic rela-
tions bar is that many couples reluctantly pursue marital litigation
when they might, with professional guidance, attempt to reconcile
their differences.
This note will attempt to survey the various methods that
have recently been developed to foster reconciliation with a view
85 See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878). The Court relied mainly
upon New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy, 241 U.S. 518 (1916) and Harris
v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
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toward comparison between the New York and sister-state "cool-
ing-off" statutes and conciliation procedures.
The Need for New Legislation
It was early recognized that often a marital action is hastily
instituted because of an emotional experience temporarily alienating
the parties. But, once the papers are filed and the accusations
involving heretofore private and intimate details are exposed to
judicial and public view, the possibility of a reconciliation becomes
considerably more remote.80
To make the courts less accessible for divorce actions, Illinois,
for a period of some ten years, had a "cooling-off" statute which
postponed the filing of the complaint in divorce actions for sixty
days from the date of service of the summons.8 7  Until the re-
cently reformed divorce law, there was no such "cooling-off"
period existent in New York because the same advantages were
thought to have been afforded by the interlocutory decree interval.
In New York, the decision or report of a court or referee in
annulment and divorce actions must be filed and an interlocutory
judgment entered within fifteen days after the party becomes so
entitled. 3 Three months after entry of the interlocutory judg-
ment, such judgment becomes final as of course.89 During the three
86 Miner, Conciliation Rather Than Reconciliation, 43 ILL. L. REv. 464
(1948); N.Y. JOINT LEGISLATIVE Comm. ON MAXTRMONIAL & FAMILY
LAws, REPORT, LEG. Doc. No. 26, at 66 (1958).
87The statute has recently been amended to provide the plaintiff with
the option of either commencing the divorce action as any other civil
case or filing a praecipe for summons. The sixty-day "cooling-off" period
is no longer in effect. ILL. Ar. STAT. ch. 40, §7a (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1966) and historical and practice notes thereto.
Some states have provided for a "cooling-off" period by requiring
a delay between the commission of the offense which justifies the matri-
monial action and the filing of the papers to commence it. See, e.g., N.J.
REv. STAT. §2A:34-2 (1951); N.C. GEur. STAT. §50-8 (Supp. 1965). The
primary purpose of these statutes is to provide the couple with a period
during which they can reflect upon their situation and possibly reconcile
their differences. See Riddell v. Guggenheim, 281 F2d 836 (9th Cir. 1960) ;
Pantle v. Pantle, 19 Ill. App. 2d 353, 153 N.E2d 740 (1958). Other
reasons given to justify these "cooling-off" statutes are that they prevent
fraud and collusion, and, in the case of statutes providing for delay be-
tween filing the complaint and the trial, they give the defendant time
to prepare his case. Boring v. Boring, 155 Kan. 99, 122 P.2d 743 (1942);
Calvert v. Calvert, 130 Ohio St. 369, 199 N.E. 473 (1936).
88 DRL § 241. While the interlocutory decree has been retained, its
significance as a conciliatory measure is greatly diminished by the new
"cooling-off" period and conciliation procedures. The interlocutory period,
however, still remains as a final alternative to dissolution. See DRL § 242.
89 DRL § 242.
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month interval, however, the marriage is still in esse,90 and the
court has authority, if sufficient cause is shown, to execute an
order denying such automatic finality to the judgment.91 Reconcili-
ation would be, of course, a sufficient reason.
The value of the interlocutory interval as a period in which
the parties may resolve their differences is weakened by the pos-
sibility of a claim of condonation. An attorney may advise his
client not to have any contact with the other spouse so as to
avoid the possible assertion of the defense. Likewise, the injured
spouse may regard attempts to reconcile differences during this
period as a trick to upset the judgment.92
The remainder of this article will explore New York attempts
at "cooling-off" and conciliation conferences with references to sis-
ter-state experiences where valuable for further elucidation.
Cooling-Off
Effect of the Statute
With additional grounds for divorce being introduced in New
York, the aforementioned inability of the interlocutory system to
induce reconciliation became more pronounced and made the Illi-
nois "cooling-off" device more attractive. Consequently, Section
211 of the Domestic Relations Law was enacted to require a 120-
day period after service of the summons before the complaint
could be served in a divorce or separation action.9 3  Service of
the complaint upon the expiration of unsuccessful conciliation pro-
ceedings, however, is authorized in a divorce action before the
termination of the 120-day period.94
901; re Crandall, 196 N.Y. 127, 89 N.E. 578 (1909); Pettit v. Pettit,
105 App. Div. 312, 93 N.Y.S. 1001 (3d Dep't 1905).9 DRL § 242. See Burgher v. Burgher, 184 Misc. 682, 54 N.Y.S.2d 683
(Sup. Ct. Broome County 1945).92 Note, A "Cooling-off" Period in Divorce Actions, 24 BROOKLYN L. REV.
313, 317-18 (1958).
93 The wisdom of completely excluding mention of annulment proceed-
ings in section 211 may be questioned. An annulment may be granted for
numerous reasons spanning from the fact that a former spouse is living
to the fact that one of the spouses is underage. Section 211 should be
made applicable at least to the less reprehensible grounds. Many of these
marriages are potentially good and since the impediment which renders them
voidable is not always significantly against public policy, their continuance
should sometimes be encouraged.
94DRL §211. As will be discussed in detail later, participation in con-
ciliation proceedings is mandatory if the couple is pursuing a divorce
action. If the conciliation official determines that participation will serve
no purpose, the procedures will come to an early end and the complaint
may be filed before the termination of the 120-day period. Inasmuch as
the conciliation provisions do not apply to those commencing separation
actions, this possibility of prematurely serving a complaint does not exist.
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Although the "cooling-off" device as applied to matrimonial
actions is new in New York, it has been available in other states
for many years. Some statutes have been regarded as jurisdic-
tional, i.e., viewed as a limitation upon the power of the court,
and, thus, decrees entered prior to the expiration of the period
are void. 5 If the decree is entered after the statutory period,
but is predicated upon a trial terminating before, some courts still
regard the decree as a nullity.9" It should be noted that the
statutes held to be jurisdictional contain language directed not
only to the parties, but the court as well, and thus prevent the
courts from hearing evidence or granting relief within the pre-
scribed period since the prohibition goes to subject matter juris-
diction.9 7  The provisions are therefore mandatory and their terms
cannot be dispensed with or waived.98
The New York statute, however, which merely precludes
plaintiff's service of complaint in a separation action, may be
more easily construed as procedural. 99 The statute is concerned
only with pleading. Ostensibly, it contains no language that
could be read as a prohibition upon the exercise of jurisdiction.100
On its face, it contains no language that could be read as a
prohibition upon the exercise of jurisdiction. If a hidden purpose
of the statute is to limit the court's jurisdiction, a statutory
amendment or judicial construction will be necessary to reveal it.
Therefore, in separation actions, where conciliation proceedings
95Givens v. Givens, 304 S.W2d 577 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957). Contra,
Edelson v. Edelson, 58 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 1952) ; Jackson City Bank & Trust
Co. v. Frederick, 271 Mich. 538, 260 N.W. 908 (1935).
DOSee Garrett v. State, 118 Neb. 373, 224 N.W. 860 (1929). If only
a portion of the evidence is taken before the end of statutory period, how-
ever, at least one jurisdiction will honor the decree. Pavell v. Pavell,
168 S.W2d 283 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943). Another court has held that
only evidence admitted after the statutory period may be considered.
Brown v. Brown, 6 Pa. D. & C. 698 (1925).
07 E.g., NEB. Rnv. STAT. §42-305.02 (1960).
98 Beeler v. Beeler, 218 S.W. 553 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920).
99Although section 211 applies to divorce as well as separation actions,
this discussion must be restricted to the latter because of section 215-g.
This section provides that no divorce action shall be brought to trial until
a final report is filed by a conciliation commissioner (to be discussed
later) or the termination of the 120-day "cooling-off" period. This lan-
guage apparently is intended to limit the subject matter jurisdiction of the
court. It does not apply to separation actions which are only discussed
in section 211.
100 Compare "No suit for divorce shall be heard or tried until after ser-
vice has been had or perfected . . . but in no event . . . until sixty days
after the filing of plaintiff's petition" NEB. REv. STAT. § 42-305.02 (1960)
(emphasis added) with "an action for divorce or separation shall be com-
menced by the service of a summons. A verified complaint in such action
-may not be served until the expiration of one hundred and twenty days
from the date of service of the summons or the expiration of conciliation
proceedings . . . whichever period is less." DRL §211 (emphasis added).
Cf. DRL §215-g.
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are not required, the courts may be inclined to entertain a suit
prior to the expiration of 120 days if both parties join in a stipu-
lation agreement to dispense with the remainder of the period.
Such an agreement under proper circumstances may be sufficient
indication of the irreconciliability of the couple to convince the
court that further delay would be ineffectual. If there is no in-
dication of fraud, and the defendant does not need the additional
time to prepare his defense, the court could very well honor
such an agreement and proceed immediately.101
The Statutory Period
The computations necessary to determine when the statutory
period ends have been the subject of some litigation.10 2  In states
where the delay is imposed between the time of filing the complaint
and the commencement of the trial, it has been held that if the
plaintiff amends the complaint but does not alter the cause of
action, the "cooling-off" period is computed from the time the
original complaint is filed.' 0 3 Such a problem would never arise
in New York since the waiting period occurs between the filing
of the summons and the complaint.
An analagous question could arise concerning the satisfaction
of the waiting period if the service of summons was defective and
another was subsequently served, with the computations starting
from the time of the first service. So long as there is a total of
120 days during which the plaintiff can reflect upon his action
there would seem to be no harm in computing the period from
the time of the first service. More often than not, the defendant
will be aware of the plaintiff's activities and will be afforded an
opportunity to appeal to him and possibly effect a reconciliation.
If, under an unusual circumstance, the defendant does not know
of the institution of the action, the court might then compute the
period from the time of the second service so as to enable the
defendant to appeal to his spouse.
o0 'ee Dyer v. Dyer, 300 Ky. 559, 189 S.W.2d 842 (1945). The court
could justify this action despite the statute by arguing that section 211
was never intended to apply to hopelessly irreconcilable couples. The prim-
ary purpose of the provision is to provide the spouses with a period for
serious reflection before continuing the action. Such would be an idle
gesture if the evidence conclusively demonstrated that the delay would be
fruitless.
102For two interesting cases concerning computations of time and dis-
cussing what a difference a day makes, see Boring v. Boring, 155 Kan. 99,
122 P.2d 743 (1942), and Snow v. Snow, 223 S.W. 240 (Tex. Civ. App.
1920). This subject is now expressly treated by statute in New York.
N.Y. Gra. CoNsTR. LAW § 20.
103Hipple v. Hipple, 121 Kan. 495, 247 P. 650 (1926); Van Dyck v.
Van Dyck, 121 S.W.2d 642 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938).
[ VOL.. 42
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Relief which may be had during the period
A question arises regarding the wife's ability to move for
temporary alimony, maintenance and counsel fees during the "cool-
ing-off" period. Under prior New York law, alimony and main-
tenance could be granted only where the movant could evidence
reasonable probability of success in the action.104 Where the wife
was unable to show a cause of action, she was denied all inci-
dental relief.105 Under the recently enacted section 236,106 it was
held in Insetta v. Inmetta ' 0 7 that the court now has complete dis-
cretionary power to make such allowances for support and main-
tenance notwithstanding the wife's failure to prove her cause of
action.
In Crocker v. Crocker,04 the court held that in the light of
these developments and the purpose of the "cooling-off" statute,
a motion for temporary alimony and counsel fees may still be
entertained simultaneously with or immediately after the com-
mencement of a separation action. The court emphasized that the
wife should not be allowed to show the specifics of her case and
thus jeopardize any reconciliation efforts. The court analogized
incidental motions in a separation action with those in a divorce
action where the statute allows such relief on a mere showing
of the husband's financial ability and the movant's needs. 0 9 Im-
portantly, the court held that the filing of the complaint in a
separation action before the termination of the "cooling-off" period
necessitates the dismissal of the action.110
104 Kingston v. Kingston, 283 App. Div. 355, 128 N.Y.S.2d 78 (3d Dep't
1954) (decided under CPA § 1164, the predecessor to DRL §§ 236-37).
105 Fein v. Fein, 261 N.Y. 441, 185 N.E. 693 (1923); Kamman v. Kam-
man, 167 App. Div. 423, 152 N.Y.S. 579 (4th Dep't 1915).
106 Section 236 authorizes the court to grant alimony to the wife "not-
withstanding that the court refuses to grant the relief requested by the
wife (1) by reason of a finding by the court that a divorce, annulment
or judgment declaring the marriage a nullity had previously been granted
to the husband in an action in which jurisdiction over the person of the
wife was not obtained, or (2) by reason of the misconduct of the wife, un-
less such misconduct would itself constitute grounds for separation or
divorce, or (3) by reason of a failure of proof of the grounds of the
wife's action or counterclaim."
10720 App. Div. 2d 544, 245 N.Y.S.2d 133 (2d Dep't 1963). Accord,
Frank v. Frank, 26 App. Div. 2d 837, 274 N.Y.S.2d 294 (2d Dep't 1966).
10854 Misc. 2d 738, 283 N.Y.S.2d 362 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1967).
20 DRL § 215-e.
110 Crocker v. Crocker, 54 Misc. 2d 738, 283 N.Y.S.2d 362 (Sup. Ct.
Queens County 1967).
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Conciliation
Prior Conciliation Schemes
The value of conciliation proceedings became apparent to the
New York legislature long before it embraced the "cooling-off"
concept."" The first significant legislation in New York was
Section 1165-b of the Civil Practice Act which empowered the
justices of the Supreme Court to establish a voluntary marital
conciliation service." 2  One of the major weaknesses of the Act
was that it required the continued consent of both parties through-
out the conferences.
The judicial reorganization of 1962 established the Family
Court,"13 and conferred upon it jurisdiction over "proceedings for
[the] conciliation of spouses. . . ." 14 Supplementary legislation
provides that one spouse may initiate the proceedings by filing a
petition in the Family Court expressing the need for counseling
by the court's Probation Service because the marriage is in
trouble." 5 It also mollifies the mutual consent provision of the
CPA. Now the court has the power upon application of the
petitioner to order the reluctant spouse to attend a conciliation
conference if, after a hearing, the court concludes that such
attendance could possibly effectuate reconciliation." 6
"While the "cooling-off" section in question became effective Septem-
ber 1, 1967, conciliation proceedings in varying forms and degrees have
been available in New York for over ten years. The first significant
conciliation program was instituted without precise statutory authority but
rather by the exercise of the judicial rule-making power of the Supreme
Court. The First judicial District established Part XII in 1955 to ex-
clusively hear matrimonial actions and proceedings. The justices had dis-
cretionary power to refer cases to twvo caseworkers, and outside assistance
was sometimes utilized. This machinery was used primarily for the nego-
tiation of agreements concerning custody, support and maintenance rather
than reconciliation. Additionally, the justices vho served in Part XII
complained of the lack of funds to adequately staff and maintain these
auxiliary services. See N.Y. JOINT LEaIsLArrv ComM. oN MATRIMONIAL
& FAMELY LAWS, RnRT, LEG. Doc. No. 26, at 60, 66 (1958).
112 With the enactment of the CPLR, this section was transferred to
Section 154(a) of the Judiciary Law and has recently been repealed by
N.Y. Sess. Laws 1966, ch. 254, § 13.
11 N.Y. CoNsT. art. VI, § 13(a).
114 N.Y. CoxsT. art. VI, § 13(b) (6).
115 FCA § 921.
IMG FCA. 924. This power should be utilized sparingly. One com-
mentator urges that the best way to salvage a marriage is by positive
motivation-an appeal to the rewards, hungers, and desires stimulating
human action and attitudes, as opposed to negative motivation accomplished
through threats such as court orders. Cayley, Conciliation Counseling in a
Family Court, 30 FED. PROBATION 27 (1966). Apparently cognizant of this
fact, the Act allows the Probation Service to "invite" the petitioner's
spouse to attend the conference and only if he does not subsequently attend
is any coercive procedure authorized. FCA §§ 922, 924.
[ VOL.. 42
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If the petitioner's spouse attends one conference, either volun-
tarily pursuant to an "invitation" or by the coercion of a court
order, and then fails to attend any others, the court upon due
notice may hold hearings to determine whether the proceedings
should terminate. If the court decides that further conferences
are feasible, it may direct the spouses to attend another confer-
ence.117 The reluctant spouse cannot be made to attend beyond
ninety days after the petition is filed unless there is a subsequent
consent.11 8
The recent amendment to the divorce law significantly narrows
the scope of these Family Court activities. As will be discussed
later, a conciliation bureau is established to conduct all conciliation
proceedings after the institution of divorce actions. This use of
the word "all" apparently strips the Family Court of conciliatory
jurisdiction in divorce cases once a suit has been commenced,
thus leaving to the Family Court couples who have not yet taken
legal action or who are involved in separation or annulment actions.
Divorce Conciliation
Before discussing in detail the conciliation provisions of the
new divorce law, some examination of sister-state experiments in
this area might be of value since they are the source of the
New York formula.
In 1960, Wisconsin established a state-wide family court with
jurisdiction limited to marital disputes. As in New York, there
is a mandatory "cooling-off" period before filing the complaint.
Reconciliation attempts are automatically required during this
period for those pursuing divorce and separation actions. When
a complaint is eventually filed, it must contain only the statutory
grounds for relief but not specific allegations of misconduct. °9
Thus, the incendiary elements of some divorce pleadings are pro-
hibited.
Prior to the inauguration of the state-wide program, Milwau-
kee County conducted voluntary conciliation proceedings and statis-
tics disclose the relative effectiveness of the two systems. In the
four years preceding the creation of compulsory conciliation, thirty-
nine percent of the actions were discontinued before trial as
compared to forty-eight percent during a comparable period under
the compulsory system.220
In contrast is the method available in Los Angeles County.
As in the New York Family Court, one spouse may file a petition
11 FCA § 925.
"is FCA § 926.
I'D Foster, Comiliation amd Cowtseling in the Courts in Family Law
Cases, 41 N.Y.U.L. REv. 353, 358-60 (1966).
120 Id. at 359,
198
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for conciliation and the other spouse may be compelled to appear.
After a joint meeting, the parties are counseled separately with
the objective of having the spouses enter a "husband-wife agree-
ment" resolving the issues of contention between them and estab-
lishing mutually agreed upon remedies. Once the parties sign
the agreement, it is submitted to the judge and made an order of
the court, although the agreement is terminable by either party.
Third persons who cause disharmony, such as in-laws, may be
named as parties to the proceedings and ihereby subject themselves
to citations for contempt if they interfere with conciliation efforts.
In 1963, 64.2 percent of all petitions filed resulted in recon-
ciliation where both parties participated in the conference. Records
over an eight year period showed that three out of four couples
so reconciled were still living together. It should be noted, how-
ever, that in 1963 there were only 4,395 petitions for reconcilia-
tion while there are over 35,000 divorces filed in Los Angeles
County each year.' 12
New York's Joint Legislative Committee analyzed these and
other programs 122 before expanding the state's conciliation system,
structured primarily on the Wisconsin system. It establishes a
conciliation bureau administered and supervised by a supreme
court justice 123 empowered to appoint conciliation commissioners,
special guardians, and counselors. The commissioners and guardi-
ans must be attorneys admitted to practice in New York for at
least five years, 24 and the counselors' qualifications are fixed by
each appellate division.12 5 No social work training or experience
is required by statute for any of these positions.
Within ten days after commencing a divorce action, the
plaintiff must file a notice of the action with the bureau in the
district where lie or she resides or the action is deemed discon-
tinued.12 6 The notice must contain the names, ages, and addresses
of the parties and any minor, handicapped or incompetent children
of the couple. Upon such filing, the supervising justice refers
the matter to a commissioner, and if there are any minor, handi-
capped or incompetent children, the commissioner may request a
121 d. at 364-67.
122 For further discussion of court-oriented conciliation systems presently
in use in various states, see N.Y. JOINT LEGISLATIVE CoMMx1!. ON MATRI-
MONIAL & FAMILY LAWS, REPORT, LEG. Doc. No. 8, at 49-83 (1966).123The supervising justice is designated by a majority of the justices
of the appellate division of the judicial department in which the district is
located. DRL § 215.
'4 DRL §215-b(b), (d).125DRL §215-b(c). The appellate division is authorized to make use
of outside agencies established in the various judicial districts.226DRL §215-c(a).
[ VOL. 42
THE QUARTERLY SURVEY
special guardian for them who is then made a party to the pro-
ceeding. 2
7
All parties must attend the first conference but if sufficient
cause is shown to the commissioner, a certificate of "no necessity"
may be secured and the conciliation procedures will terminate.12 8
If one of the parties fails to appear at the first conference, how-
ever, the commissioner may request the supervising justice to
issue an order directing such party to appear or be punished for
contempt."20  After the parties attend the first conference but the
commisioner deems that no further proceedings would be fruitful,
he may issue a certificate of "no further necessity," report the
same to the supervising justice, and the proceedings are at an
end. o0
If, alternately, the commissioner believes that further con-
ferences may be beneficial, he may refer the parties to a coun-
selor for conferences to commence ten days thereafter. The coun-
selor may, with the consent of the parties, make use of physicians,
psychiatrists, or clergymen of the religious denomination to which
the parties belong.' 31
If the conference with the counselor does not effect a reconcilia-
tion, a report is filed with the commissioner and a conciliation
hearing requested. This final report must be filed within thirty
days after referral of the matter to him.
The proceedings are at an end if the commissioner does not
consider a hearing necessary.3 2  In the event, however, that re-
conciliation is deemed possible, he may fix a date for the con-
ciliation hearing to be held within thirty days after the date of
the counselor's final report.'33 The commissioner must give notice
to each party and attendance by them is mandatory,14 but at
such hearing each party has the right to be heard, present evi-
dence, cross-examine witnesses, and be represented by counsel."'
Any party, as well as the commissioner, has the power to sub-
poena witnesses, books, documents and any other evidence.3
127DRL §215-c(b) (1). Special guardians are to protect the interest of
these children by making recommendations as to their custody, mainten-
ance and support. DRL §215-c(c).
12 DRL §215-c(b)(2). After the conciliation procedures are thus ter-
minated, the plaintiff need not wait for the expiration of the 120-day
"cooling-off" period in order to serve the complaint. DRL § 211.
12 DRL § 215-c (b) (3).
130 DRL § 215-c(b) (4) (b).
31 DRL § 215-c(e).
132 DRL § 215-d(a).
133DRL §215-d(a), (d).
134DRL §215-d(a).
135 DRL § 215-d(b).
13 DRL §215-d(c).
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Compulsory Reconciliation
One of the more controversial sections of the new conciliation
article'3 7 is section 215-d(e). Pursuant to this section, the
commissioner, on the basis of the evidence submitted at the hear-
ing, may conclude that a reconciliation is possible and in the best
interest of all concerned. He must submit his finding to the
supervising justice and apply for a sixty-day order compelling
the parties to attempt a reconciliation.
As previously discussed, most marriage experts question the
efficacy of coerced reconciliation."a  Furthermore, it is question-
able whether contempt proceedings may be instituted for failure
to comply witlh the sixty-day order. All other references to
orders appearing in Article 11-B have an accompanying provision
authorizing contempt proceedings for non-compliance.' If the
exclusion of any reference to contempt proceedings in section
215-d(e) was intended to manifest an absence of judicial power
to do so, a serious question may be raised as to the propriety of
authorizing unenforceable court orders. In the event, however,
that the exception for this section is construed as a mere inad-
vertance, and contempt citations are issued for non-compliance,
some serious constitutional questions would be raised.
Assuming, arguendo, that contempt proceedings are authorized
by section 215-d(e), they must be based on the party's failure to
"attempt to effect a reconciliation." It has been held that con-
tempt proceedings are so similar in nature to criminal prosecu-
tions that the requirements of due process must be satisfied.' 40 A
criminal statute must explicitly establish a standard of guilt and
clearly specify proscribed conduct. It cannot be so vaguely drafted
that reasonable men might differ as to its meaning and applica-
tion, or due process will be violated . 4  Likewise, a court order
in the marital sphere must be precise and leave no reasonable
doubt about the extent of its command. 4 2  Consequently, vagueness
may well be a good defense in a contempt proceeding 43
If a court order pursuant to section 215-d(e) is issued,
reasonable men could differ as to its scope and extent. Will one
conversation attempting to reach a compromise suffice? Must
the parties seek professional marital counseling? The problem
of definiteness might be resolved by the court's drafting an order
specifically delineating the required conduct. But if the court
137DRL art. 11-B.
18 See supra note 117.
139DRL §§ 215-c(b) (3), 215-d(c).
140Lynch v. Ublenhapp, 248 Iowa 68, 78 N.W.2d 491 (1956).
1
4
3Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399 (1966); Baggett v. Bullitt,
377 U.S. 360 (1964) ; Cramp v. Board of Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961).
1 42G. v. Souder, 305 S.W.2d 883 (Mo. Ct. App. 1957).
14 3 Brody v. District Ct., 250 Iowa 1217, 98 N.W.2d 726 (1959).
[ VOL. 42
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drafts such a specific order, the problem of coercion arises. In
the case of People ex rel. Bernat v. Bicek,'" Illinois' highest court
held a conciliation statute unconstitutional because, inter alia,'"
the statute was coercive. Noting that the conciliation statute did
not require, as a prerequisite, the consent of the parties to attempt
a reconciliation, "there would be an element of compulsion present
which . . . basic law does not sanction" when a party opposes
such efforts.1 "
Conclusion
The new divorce law is a significant step in bringing New
York in line with recent prophylactic concepts concerning the
role of law in marital litigation. However, there are several in-
adequacies which should be investigated and corrected.
As discussed above, section 215-g prohibits the trial of a
divorce action until the conciliation commissioner's final report
is filed with the supervising justice or the 120-day "cooling-off" pe-
riod expires. Therefore, if the conferences continue for an extended
period, the conciliation efforts will not be thwarted, for at least
120 days, by a simultanous trial of the action. However, the
absence of a delay provision applicable to separation actions creates
a possibility of such a concurrent trial. For example, suppose
the wife institutes a separation action necessitating the 120-day
delay, and, toward the end of the "cooling-off" interval, the hus-
band institutes a suit for divorce which incidentally requires the
couple to attend conciliation conferences. There is no statutory
prohibition to trying the wife's separation action after her "cool-
ing-off" interval ends, and concurrently holding the conciliation
conferences incident to the husband's divorce action. Apparently
144405 Ill. 510, 91 N.E.2d 588 (1950).
145 Another constitutional objection to the statute was that it authorized
the assistance of representatives of the religious denominations to which
the parties belonged. The court challenged the use of the state-established
and tax-supported instrumentality by religious groups to spread their faith.
The court also recognized a conceptual problem of inviting representatives
of faiths which categorically opposed divorce under any circumstances. How
can such representatives "be expected to respond to an invitation to repair
to and aid a civil court when their religion considers the proceedings a
nullity?" 405 Ill. at 525-26, 91 N.E.2d at 596. This problem might easily
be resolved by realizing that the religious denomination worrying the
court, obviously the Roman Catholic Church, does not consider the pro-
ceedings a nullity for all purposes. All incidental relief granted in divorce
actions is not condemned. The decree is dishonored only to the extent that
it purports to dissolve the marriage. Such a distinctidn is important in
the New York context due to section 215-c(e) which also authorizes the
use of the clergy by the conciliation bureau.
146 People ex tel. Bernat v. Bicek, 405 IIl. 510, 91 N.E2d 588 (1950).
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the court could not consolidate the actions because the conciliation
bureau has no jurisdiction over separations.147
There should be a provision authorizing a stay of separation
actions while court-sponsored conciliation conferences are in pro-
gress. In this manner, the inconsistency between divorce and
separation provisions, which may give rise to an inadvertent sub-
version of the intent to promote reconciliation, will be eliminated.
The conciliation procedures of both the family court and the
conciliation bureau provide ample judicial review of the couple's
progress in order to filter out those who are merely using the
program for stalling tactics.
There are also problems concerning the prerequisites for em-
ployment with the conciliation bureau. The only statutory quali-
fications for commissioners and special guardians is five year mem-
bership in the bar although their duties may often require non-
legal counseling. Required attendance in a comprehensive course
in social work would certainly increase their effectiveness. Addi-
tionally, the statute gives each appellate division the discretion in
formulating the rules for the appointment of counselors. The
counselor plays the most vital role in the proceedings and uniform
qualifications should be established by the Judicial Conference or
the legislature to assure consistent quality of counseling through-
out the state. Such state-wide prerequisites would significantly
lessen the possibilities of political patronage inherent in the present
system.
147 Brinknann v. Brinkmann, 54 Misc. 2d 882, 283 N.Y.S.2d 680 (Sup.
Ct N.Y. County 1967) (dictum).
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